Recognition of Mental State Terms
Clinical Findings in Children with Autism and a Functional Neuroimaging Study of Normal Adults

SIMON BARON-COHEN, HOWARD RING, JOHN MORIZART, BETTINA SCHMITZ, DURVAL COSTA and PETER ELL

**Background.** The mind's ability to think about the mind has attracted substantial research interest in cognitive science in recent decades, as 'theory of mind'. No research has attempted to identify the brain basis of this ability, probably because it involves several separate processes. As a first step, we investigated one component process - the ability to recognise mental state terms.

**Method.** In Experiment 1, we tested a group of children with autism (known to have theory of mind deficits) and a control group of children with mental handicap, for their ability to recognise mental state terms in a word list. This was to test if the mental state recognition task was related to traditional theory of mind tests. In Experiment 2, we investigated if in the normal brain, recognition of mental state terms might be localised. The procedure employed single photon emission computerised tomography (SPECT) in normal adult volunteers. We tested the prediction (based on available neurologica and animal lesion studies) that there would be increased activation in the orbito-frontal cortex during this task, relative to a control condition, and relative to an adjacent frontal area (frontal-polar cortex).

**Results.** In Experiment 1, the group with autism performed significantly worse than the group without autism. In Experiment 2, there was increased cerebral blood flow during the mental state recognition task in the right orbito-frontal cortex relative to the left frontal-polar region.

**Conclusions.** This simple mental state recognition task appears to relate to theory of mind, in that both are impaired in autism. The SPECT results implicate the orbito-frontal cortex as the basis of this ability.

Thinking about thinking seems to be one of the abilities that makes human cognition unique. This capacity for reflective thought has been variously dubbed theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Astington et al., 1988), metarepresentation (Pylyshyn, 1978; Leslie, 1987), recursive mental model building (Johnson-Laird, 1983), self-consciousness (Johnson-Laird, 1988), mindreading (Whiten, 1991), or the intentional stance (Dennett, 1978). Here we refer to it as 'theory of mind', a generic term within cognitive science to denote the mind's ability to think about the range of mental states (intentions, desires, thoughts, beliefs, dreams, pretence, etc.).

Researching theory of mind is important in its own right, and also likely to throw light on the severe childhood psychiatric syndrome of autism. Children with autism have been shown to be impaired in a range of theory of mind tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1989a,b, 1992a; Ferner et al., 1989, Reed & Peterson, 1990; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Swettenham, 1992; Phillips, 1993; see Baron-Cohen et al., 1993, for an overview of this area). This cognitive deficit is thought to underlie the social and communicative difficulties such children show (Baron-Cohen, 1988, 1990; Frith, 1989; Happé, 1993; Tager-Flusberg, 1993).

We report studies which are part of our longer term aim of identifying where in the brain theory of mind might be localised; and where in autistic children a specific dysfunction in this process might be occurring.

Functional neuroimaging techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET) or single photon emission computerised tomography (SPECT) require cognitive activation tasks comprising simple processes for repetition during the period of radio-active ligand uptake in the brain, in order to maximise the production of a clear signal. This period varies from about 40 seconds (for bolus H,15O injections in PET) to about 5 minutes in the SPECT techniques used below. Traditional theory of mind tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) are not simple enough, and take too long (at least 60 seconds each) to be repeated many times in the limited time period available. We therefore selected to investigate one aspect of theory of mind, namely the ability to
identify mental state terms, using a novel paradigm designed to allow repeated performance of this process.

While such a task does not require inferences about the content of mental states, or about the relation between mental states and action, we reasoned that mental state terms might be processed separately in the normal brain. The idea that different semantic categories might be localised neurologically has some plausibility, given studies of specific naming and comprehension deficits in some neurological patients (Warrington & Shallice, 1984; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Goodglass et al., 1966). If mental state terms are processed separately, this would be consistent with the notion that theory of mind is modular, both in cognitive and neuro-biological terms (Leslie, 1991, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 1990, 1992b, 1994; Baron-Cohen & Ring, 1994).

In Experiment 2, we employed an experimental task (see Method) that fulfilled the essential criteria for cognitive activation in neuroimaging studies (George et al., 1991). We wanted first to check that this task was indeed related to theory of mind. Children with autism mostly fail theory of mind tests (see references cited above). We had every reason to predict that children with autism would fail on this task, since their spontaneous speech in most cases specifically lacks mental state terms (Tager-Flusberg, 1993). This was the basis for the first experiment.

**Experiment 1**

**Subjects**

We tested a group of 15 children with autism, diagnosed according to established criteria (Rutter, 1978; American Psychiatric Association, 1987), who were attending special schools for autism in the London area. Their age range was 8–16 years; verbal mental age (Test of Reception of Grammar (TROG); Bishop, 1983) was 4–6 years age-equivalent (with one subject scoring at an age-equivalent of 10 years). We also tested a second group of 15 children who had a similar age and mental age range, the latter assessed on the TROG. They were attending schools for children with learning difficulties in the London area. The details of the subjects are shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subjects’ ages and mental ages, in Experiment 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chronological age (years : months)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mental handicap</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>range</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Method**

Each child was tested individually in a quiet room in the school. They were first asked a control question: “Do you know what is inside your head?” If the subject replied “No”, or gave an answer that did not include the word ‘mind’, then they were told that their mind was also in their head. All of the group with mental handicap, but only a third of the group with autism, spontaneously mentioned their mind in answer. (The others gave responses which included reference to the brain, hair, blood, and bones.) After the clarification that their mind was in their head, they were then asked “Do you know what the mind can do?”. If the subject did not spontaneously mention ‘thinking’ or any other related mental activity, then this was also supplied by the experimenter. All but two subjects in the group with mental handicap, but only four children with autism, spontaneously mentioned ‘thinking’ or a related mental activity (remembering, dreaming, etc.) in response to this question. Following this clarification of the mind’s activity (which served as a warm-up and brief training phase), the experiment began.

The subject was asked to read aloud the words on the first word list (see Appendix A), in order to check that they could read the words. If the subject had any difficulty with this (and very few of them did), the experimenter helped to read the word. The experimenter then said: “OK. Now let’s look at each word. I want you to say if each word is something the mind can do?”. The experimenter then pointed to the first word in the list, and said, “Let’s begin here”. If the child spontaneously worked through the list, then no further instruction was given. If however the child did not begin the task, the experimenter pointed to the first word in the list and asked “Can the mind do this?”. The child then worked down the list, in fixed order, the experimenter pointing to each word in turn, asking “And can the mind do this?”.

Word list A contained 8 mental state words and 8 non-mental state words. The child received a final score out of 16. This guarded against a Yes- or No-bias.
Table 2
Number of children in each group, passing each Word List, in Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>List A</th>
<th>List B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autism (n = 15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental handicap (n = 15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fail</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P < 0.0002.

Following this, the child was given a second word list (see Appendix B). In place of the 8 mental state words were 8 words that described what the body could do, alongside 8 foil words neither body- nor mind-related. The subject was again instructed to read through the word list and the same procedure was followed, the question being "Can the body do this?". The score was again out of 16.

Finally, the order of presentation of word lists A and B was counterbalanced in each group, in order to guard against order-effects.

Results

Table 2 shows the number of children in each group passing the test, where a pass is defined as scoring equal to or more than 6 out of 8 on the target words, and equal to or more than 6 out of 8 on the foil words, on each list. The criterion of 6 or more out of 8 was based on establishing above chance performance, given that for each word, a correct score could be obtained with a probability of 0.5. The probability of passing 6 target words, or 6 foil words, by chance would therefore be extremely small (P = 0.0156).

Only 26.7% of the group with autism passed on list A, while 93.3% of them passed on list B. In contrast, all subjects in the group with mental handicap passed on lists A and B. This group difference on list A was highly significant (x^2 = 14.35, d.f. = 1, P = 0.0002). Finally, the four children with autism who passed on list A did not differ from the 11 who failed in terms of either chronological or verbal mental age (both P > 0.05).

Discussion

As predicted, children with autism were significantly impaired in recognising which words in a word-list were mind-related, compared with performance by a group of non-autistic children with mental handicap (and of an equivalent verbal mental age). This deficit is further evidence for an autism-specific impairment in the child's concept of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993), and provides us with preliminary evidence that the recognition task we used taps a component process in the larger domain of 'theory of mind'. Given its brevity and potential for repeatability, this task is well-suited to the requirements of neuro-imaging. In Experiment 2, we used an adult version of the task with a group of normal adult volunteers, in order to test if a specific brain region is involved in theory of mind tasks. We did not include individuals with autism in this investigation for ethical reasons.

Experiment 2

The use of SPECT employing 99mtechnetium-hexamethyl propylene amine oxime (99mTc-HMPAO) and a triple-headed, brain-dedicated gamma-camera, allowed the production of high quality images with a shorter scan-acquisition time, and using lower doses of labelled ligand, than earlier SPECT paradigms. This technique is described elsewhere (Costa et al., 1986, 1989; George et al., 1991, review; Kouris et al., 1992). 99mTc-HMPAO is a lipophilic radiotracer which rapidly crosses the blood-brain barrier after intravenous administration, entering active neuronal cells in proportion to blood flow and then becoming trapped intracellularly in a hydrophilic state. Entering active neurons within 1–2 minutes after administration, it remains stable in those neurons for several hours, giving an accurate representation of the activity of the brain at the time of administration.

Experiment 2 required a comparison of cerebral blood flow during an experimental and a control task. As in Experiment 1, our experimental task involved judging if each word in a word list was a mind-related term or not. In our control task, the subject had to judge if each word in a new word list was a body-related term or not. This ensured that the target words in each condition related to people, and that the task demands were identical. We reasoned that if any difference in cerebral activation pattern was found, this might be due to one key difference between the tasks: that of processing mental state terms.

Planned analysis of scans, and predictions

We decided to perform a planned comparison of specific brain regions, based on four lines of evidence. Firstly, given that children with autism have specific impairments in the development of a theory of mind, and are specifically impaired on this mental state term recognition task (see Experiment 1, above), one possibility is that in autism the brain system responsible for theory of mind may be specifically
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damaged (Baron-Cohen, 1990; Morton et al, 1991; Baron-Cohen & Ring, 1994). Although no consistent
brain damage has been identified across cases, children with autism show classic signs of frontal
lobe damage, such as repetitive behaviours, an inability to inhibit attention to salient objects (Russell
et al, 1991), and deficits in tests of ‘executive
function’, such as the Tower of Hanoi, the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, and Milner’s Maze
Test (Prior & Hoffman, 1990; Ozonoff et al, 1991;
Hughes & Russell, 1993). Since executive function
tasks appear to be localised in the frontal cortex of
the brain (Shalllice, 1988), we surmised that theory
of mind might also be localised in the frontal lobes,
albeit in at least two parts (an idea also discussed by Bishop, 1992), and we decided to restrict our planned analysis
of brain regions to the frontal lobes.

Secondly, clinical descriptions of adult patients
with known frontal lobe lesions not only show per-
severation and failure to control attention, but
also show social abnormalities (Shalllice, 1988),
suggesting that acquired frontal lobe damage
may indeed disrupt social understanding. More
specifically, patients with orbito-frontal lesions show
loss of interest in social contact, and impaired social
judgement (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Price et al,
1990). Thirdly, animal studies show that monkeys with
orbo-frontal lesions (but not lateral-frontal lesions) show increased social avoidance (Buster et al, 1968).

Fourthly, patients with orbito-frontal lesions have
difficulties in the pragmatics of discourse (Kaczmarek,
1984), itself thought to require a theory of mind
(Baron-Cohen, 1988; Hanne, 1993; Tager-Flusberg,
1993). The evidence for the orbito-frontal hypo-
thesis of theory of mind and autism is reviewed
and discussed more extensively elsewhere (Baron-
Cohen & Ring, 1994).

On the strength of these strands of evidence, we
predicted that the orbito-frontal region of the brain
would be significantly more activated during the
mental state term recognition task than an adjacent
frontal lobe region – the frontal polar region. To test
for laterality effects, we examined four areas: left
and right orbito-frontal cortex, and left and right
frontal-polar cortex.

Subjects

Our subjects were 12 healthy male volunteers, all
students aged 20–24 years. They were thus of broadly
homogeneous intelligence and educational level. As
in Experiment 1, each subject participated in both
the experimental and control conditions, and the
order of these was counterbalanced.
SPECT scan acquisition and identification of cortical regions

Subjects were scanned on a triple-headed brain-dedicated SPECT system (GE/CGR Neurocam), using general purpose collimators. In air, the transaxial spatial resolution in the centre of the field of view, using such collimators, is 9.5 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM) (Moore et al, 1992). Images were acquired over 22 minutes, as 128 projections in a 64×64 matrix. Images were reconstructed using software provided by the scanner manufacturers. A Hanning prefilter was used with 1.0 cycle/cm cut off. A ramp filter was used for back-projection, and attenuation correction assumed a uniform linear attenuation coefficient (Chang type = 0.12 cm⁻¹). Transaxial images were reconstructed parallel to the orbito-mental plane. The reconstructed horizontal and sagittal slices were 0.8 cm (2 pixels) thick.

For each subject, a region of interest (ROI) analysis was performed after normalising the two scans (control and experimental task) to the same total number of brain counts. Raters were blind to condition. Regions were identified from the functional images, with reference to a standard stereotaxic atlas of brain structure (Talairach & Tournoix, 1988). Counts were measured by placing 4×4 pixel ROIs in the target areas.

Regular ROIs (1.6×1.6×0.8 cm³) were used. Frontal-polar activity was measured by placing an ROI (2.05 cm³) in both hemispheres on sagittal slices 0.8 to 2.4 cm lateral to the midline of the brain, extending from 0.8 to 2.4 cm above the plane of the basal orbito-frontal cortex. Visual comparison with the atlas indicated that this area was in the region of Brodmann's area 10. Orbito-frontal activity was measured by placing an ROI (2.05 cm³) in both hemispheres, again on sagittal slices, 1.6 to 3.2 cm lateral to the midline, in the plane of the basal orbito-frontal cortex, approximately corresponding to Brodmann's area 11, but possibly also the most inferior parts of areas 10 and 32. (The orbito-frontal region is shown in Fig. 1). Finally, activation in the occipital cortex was measured by placing an ROI (2.05 cm³) in the midline occipital region in the slice in which the corpus striatum and anterior cingulate cortex are best seen. This was so that frontal blood flow could be computed relative to extra-frontal blood flow, for each subject.

Results

For each of the frontal lobe ROIs in each condition, the mean ratio to occipital ROI activity in the corresponding condition was calculated. These frontal/occipital ratios are shown in Table 3. Subsequently, the frontal to occipital ratio for each ROI in the experimental (E) condition was divided by the corresponding value for the control (C) condition. This generated what will be referred to as the corrected E/C ratio. The mean corrected E/C ratios for each ROI are shown in Table 4.

Paired t-test comparisons between these mean corrected E/C ratios, for each of the four frontal ROIs against each other, are shown in Table 5. Only

![Image](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

**Fig. 1** The orbito-frontal cortex. The main figure represents the medial aspect of the mid-line sagittal face of the right hemisphere. The diagonally striped area is a diagrammatic representation of the location of the region of interest (ROI) described in the paper as frontal-polar. The circular inset represents a view of the anterior portion of the inferior aspect of the brain. The diagonally striped areas are representations of the locations of the left and right orbito-frontal ROIs.

| Table 3: Mean frontal/occipital ratios for the four frontal regions of interest (ROIs) |
|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
|                               | RFP | LFP | ROF | LOF |
| Experimental task mean        | 0.798 | 0.768 | 0.737 | 0.716 |
| s.d.                           | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.07 |
| Control task mean              | 0.783 | 0.802 | 0.718 | 0.703 |
| s.d.                           | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.05 |
six tests were performed, in order to test the predictions outlined earlier. Using a significance level of $P < 0.008$ (or 0.05/6), in order to guard against chance significant results, this analysis revealed that activity in the right orbito-frontal cortex was significantly different from the activity in the left frontal-polar cortex during the mental state term recognition task ($t = -5.04$, $P < 0.001$). None of the other differences between regions were significant at this conservative probability level. Hence the comparison of experimental to control tasks indicates that performance of the mental state recognition task is associated with increased activity in the right orbito-frontal ROI relative to decreased activity in the left frontal polar ROI.

**Discussion**

In Experiment 2 we tested the prediction that the orbito-frontal region of the brain would be significantly more active during a mental state term recognition task than during a control task, relative to an adjacent frontal region (frontal-polar cortex). This prediction was confirmed, although only for the right orbito-frontal region relative to the left frontal-polar region. This unilateral and reciprocal effect was not predicted. The result is compatible with the idea that the orbito-frontal region plays a role in the processing of mental state concepts, as implicated by evidence from acquired lesions to that region (Kaczmarek, 1984; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Price et al., 1990).

Other possible interpretations of these data must also be considered. Firstly, while one key difference between the experimental and control conditions was the presence of mind-related words, another difference was that in the experimental condition the target words were also more abstract. Future studies to compare mind-related with other abstract words will be important and will also be relevant to questions concerning the modularity of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1990, 1994; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie, 1991; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Leslie & Roth, 1993). We suspect that to the extent that the SPECT study is revealing a neural system that is used in the mental state recognition task, this is likely to be a system dedicated to the processing of mental state terms, rather than one dedicated to all abstract terms. Other studies have shown that children with autism are not globally impaired in the comprehension of abstract words (Eskes et al., 1990; Hobson & Lee, 1989); as demonstrated in Experiment 1 here, they are specifically impaired in recognition of mind-related words.

Secondly, might the orbito-frontal cortex be just one part of a wider brain system involved in theory of mind? This possibility is very likely. In the present experiment, we carried out a focused comparison of four regions within the frontal lobes. Future studies will need to look either at the whole brain, or at the very least at more target regions, in order to test this question. One possibility is that subcortical regions such as the limbic system also play a role in theory of mind, given the evidence for the role of the limbic system (especially the amygdala) in emotion-processing (Brothers, 1990).

Thirdly, might subjects with autism have abnormalities in the orbito-frontal cortex? The common symptoms produced by orbito-frontal lesions include impaired social judgement (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985), utilisation behaviour (L’Hermitte, 1984), pragmatic/discourse breakdown (Kaczmarek, 1984), diminished aggression (Mateer & Williams, 1991), increased indifference (in monkeys: Meyer, 1972), decreased appreciation for dangerous situations (Mateer & Williams, 1991), hyper-olfactory exploration (in monkeys: Thorpe et al., 1983), diminished response to pain (Goldman-Rakic, 1987), and excessive activity (in monkeys: Ferrier, 1886). These are all behaviours which are documented in clinical descriptions of autism (Wing, 1976; Frith, 1989; Baron-Cohen & Bolton, 1993). Since adults with autism can participate in SPECT scan studies (George et al., 1992), and given the specific pattern

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**Table 4**

Mean experimental over control task ratio (E/C ratio), corrected, for each region of interest, in Experiment 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RFP</th>
<th>LFP</th>
<th>ROF</th>
<th>LOF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.d.</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RFP, right frontal polar; LFP, left frontal polar; ROF, right orbito-frontal; LOF, left orbito-frontal.

**Table 5**

$t$-test results comparing the mean experimental over control task ratios (E/C ratios), corrected, for each region of interest, against each other. (Experiment 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RFP</th>
<th>LFP</th>
<th>ROF</th>
<th>LOF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFP</td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.04*</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOF</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

RFP, right frontal polar; LFP, left frontal polar; ROF, right orbito-frontal; LOF, left orbito-frontal.

* $P < 0.001$.
of cerebral activity shown in Experiment 2, we suggest that it will be important to use tasks like the one used here with subjects with autism, during functional neuroimaging. At the very least, we would predict a different pattern of brain activity within these particular regions to that seen in the normal adults in Experiment 2.

Fourthly, could our results reflect a possible confounding effect of the greater imageability of the body-related words? This question can be considered by examining the findings of other studies that have specifically investigated imageability. In a series of studies, Goldenberg and colleagues investigated the cerebral basis of visual imagery in normal volunteers (Goldenberg et al., 1987, 1989a,b, 1991). Combining the results from these studies, the authors concluded that while there was no evidence for an ‘imagery centre’, there was support for the hypothesis that the cerebral correlates of visual imagery, involving inferior temporal and occipital regions, are different from that of non-imaginial thinking. Note that no pre-frontal cortical regions were implicated in the process of visual imagery, making it unlikely that the prefrontal findings from Experiment 2 (above) simply reflect the use of imagery.

Fifthly, could our results simply be an effect of semantic monitoring? This explanation is important to consider, since Petersen et al. (1988), using PET, demonstrated that activation in the prefrontal cortex was associated with semantic monitoring. However, Petersen et al.’s results come from a comparison of semantic monitoring with a control condition consisting of the passive presentation of words. In our study both conditions involved semantic monitoring, thereby controlling for this process. Not surprisingly then, their results were different from ours, involving activation in the left prefrontal cortex 0.6 cm below the anterior cingulate/posterior cingulate (AC–PC) line. This more lateral region is distinct from both the orbital frontal and frontal polar regions investigated in our own study.

Related to the last point, could the difference between conditions be due to neural pathways responsible for verb recognition versus noun-recognition? This possibility is raised since, although both conditions contained a mix of nouns and verbs, and although the relative frequency of these did not differ significantly between the two conditions, the nouns in the mental state condition were often derived from verbs (e.g. knowledge derives from know). However, PET studies have not demonstrated that noun–noun vs. noun–verb comparisons activate distinct cortical areas. Rather, in both types of semantic task, an increase in superior temporal gyri is seen (Wise et al., 1991). Given these findings, and given that our analysis was of frontal regions, this suggests that our results are unlikely to reflect noun v. verb processing differences.

Finally, one puzzling question is the significance of the reciprocal responses between the left frontal polar and right orbito-frontal cortices. It may be that the former is involved in the body-term recognition task, just as the latter is activated by the mental state term recognition task. However, there appears to be no other evidence supporting this possibility. Alternatively, it may be that both of these two cerebral regions are involved, in a reciprocal manner, in the performance of the experimental task here. There are certainly other reports in the imaging literature which propose a reciprocal relationship between distant brain sites, associated with specific tasks or states. Such a relationship has been proposed, for example, between anterior and posterior insulate regions in patients with depression (Benzh et al., 1993). However, unlike that situation, there are no known strong and specific functional connections between contralateral orbito-frontal and frontal polar regions. This reciprocal effect merits further investigation.

Conclusions

From our evidence, we suggest that this cortical region is related to the processes involved in theory of mind. This is consistent with Stuss’s (1999, p. 258) idea that a key function of the prefrontal cortex is for “knowing about knowing”. It is also consistent with the clinical evidence suggesting frontal lobe damage can lead to a lack of self-reflective capacity (Ackerly & Benton, 1948; Luria, 1969). Our contribution has been to demonstrate indications of a role for the orbito-frontal cortex in this function. This result is compatible with studies showing that damage to the orbito-frontal cortex can lead to a failure to introspect (de Noble, 1835; cited in Blumer & Bensoa, 1975). Previous studies have all been based on cases of acquired damage to the orbito-frontal cortex. In contrast, given the clinical results from Experiment 1 reported here, our theory of autism posits early developmental damage to the same area. From other evidence from autism, we might expect this area to be part of a wider brain system (Baron-Cohen & Ring, 1994).

Acknowledgements

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Appendix A
Mind-related word list (score out of 16).
Letter Car Dream Think Tape Horse Want Computer Know
Flower School Remember Pretend Cover Idea Understand

Appendix B
Body-related word list (score out of 16).
Letter Car Hand Eye Tape Horse Face Computer Walk
Flower School Blood Mouth Cover Finger Nose

Appendix C
Mind-related word list used in Experiment 2.
Know Think Want Mind Idea Believe Expect Plan
Remember Understand Decide Attend Recognise Hope
Wish Assume Thought Realise Knowledge Forget Doubt
Imagine Memory Desire Dream Belief Guess Realisation
 Pretend Intention Imagination Intention Ignore Pretend
Reason Decision Learn Fantasy Consider Disbelieve

Appendix D
Body-related word list used in Experiment 2.
Hand Eyes Move Run Face Foot Body Sit Walk Stand Head
Arm Heart Digest Hair Fight Face Hit Tooth Blood Build
Eat Mouth Finger Head Speak Muscle Artery Ear Smell
Throat Jump Chest Smile Swim Blood Tongue Elbow Sleep
Neck

Foil words (these appeared in both lists in Experiment 2,
randomly inserted among the target words).
Business Present Nation Plant District Buy Note Table
Clock Leaf Pen Computer Letter Car Tape Horse Flower
School Cover Country

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and Mental Disease, 27, 479-504.
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and regulation of behaviour by representation memory.


RECOGNITION OF MENTAL STATE TERMS


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